Stop Genocide of Tamils, in Sri Lanka.

* Sri Lanka

Series: US embassy cables: the documents
US embassy cables: the documents
US embassy cables: 'Progress' on human rights in Sri Lanka

* guardian.co.uk, Thursday 16 December 2010 21.30 GMT

Friday, 22 January 2010, 09:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000050
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB
EO 12958 DECL: 01/22/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PREF, PHUM, PTER, EAID, MOPS, CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: ASSESSING PROGRESS ON KEY ISSUES
REF: A. 09 COLOMBO 1176 B. COLOMBO 32 C. COLOMBO 8
COLOMBO 00000050 001.8 OF 004
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)

1. (S) According to Congressional mandates and Administration policy, U.S. assistance to Sri Lanka, particularly military assistance, is tied to progress by the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) on several key issues, including treatment of IDPs, human rights, political reconciliation, and accountability for alleged crimes perpetrated by GSL troops and officials during the war with the LTTE. The GSL has progressed more or less on each of these issues since the end of the conflict. Continued or increased U.S. assistance, however, hinges on the GSL broadening and deepening this progress.

2. (S) Outlined below are these key issue areas with discussion of what progress has been made so far and what further progress we would like to see. It is important to note that we are not offering this list as a set of "benchmarks," which the GSL must meet to qualify for more robust engagement. Our experience with benchmarks in the Sri Lankan context (and elsewhere as well) is that the government often makes notable progress but in areas not anticipated, or in ways not foreseen, by our benchmarks. Thus, the following list of favored steps is not meant to be exhaustive but rather illustrative. Actual progress will have to be assessed as it happens.

3. (S) It also is important to note that the upcoming presidential election -- particularly if it were to result in an opposition victory -- could radically alter the political context of our assessment of GSL progress on key issues. Opposition candidate General Fonseka has made many significant promises in each of these issue areas, and we could expect that his new government would be interested in moving forward more quickly than the Rajapaksa government. Nevertheless, the key issue areas of concern remain the same notwithstanding the election, and we would expect any Sri Lankan government to continue to make progress. Please note that our lists of "Next Steps" are not in any order of priority or importance.

IDPs

----

4. (S) There has been a dramatic improvement in the treatment of IDPs and their living conditions over the past several months. Whether because of international pressure or electoral politics, the result is that 106,007 displaced persons remain in GSL camps, according to UNHCR, down from a high of over 280,000. Large numbers who left the camps remain in transit camps or with host families and have not yet returned to their places of origin. Although humanitarian access to camps has been inconsistent since the end of the war, most organizations reported that access was now granted upon request. Protection monitoring and confidential interviews with IDPs are still prohibited, and the ICRC revised mandate has not been finalized. ICRC headquarters is assessing whether to accept the GSL offer of a general rather than a detailed MOU. Access to returnee areas for INGOs is still limited to those engaged in de-mining and one medical organization in the Vanni, although the government and local authorities were reportedly working to extend this to other groups. INGOs in Jaffna were recently authorized to work by the Governor of the North but await confirmation from the Presidential Task Force.

5. (S) Next steps:

COLOMBO 00000050 002.4 OF 004

-- Renew ICRC mandate. -- Provide transparent criteria and regularized processes for INGO access to the north. -- Provide transparent criteria and regularized processes for access to returnee areas for journalists. -- Continue to release or prosecute LTTE and other Tamil detainees according to a judicial process. -- Implement a national system for tracing separated family members. -- Continue GSL reintegration of returnees.

Human Rights

------------

6. (S) Numbers of disappearances have experienced a steady and significant decline across the island since the end of the war, and the Attorney General's Office, the Ministry of Human Rights and Disaster Relief, and other institutions have conducted investigations into some of the cases. For example, on December 21, Attorney General Peiris told Ambassador that there was an 11-person team working under Deputy Solicitor General De Livera to look into questions of disappearances and other potential violations under the Emergency Regulations (ref A). Peiris claimed that 100 (presumably innocent) people had been found in detention and released during the previous 45 days, and the team was continuing its investigations. He was going to Anuradhapura himself later that week to look at 33 cases and to decide whether the suspects could be released.

7. (S) Child soldiers affiliated with the TMVP have been significantly reduced over the past year, with just five reportedly remaining at the end of 2009, according to UNICEF; the government appears to be working actively to find the remaining child soldiers. On January 13, imprisoned journalist J.S. Tissainayagam was released on bail, and Post is not aware of any additional physical attacks on journalists since June, although there still have been threats.

8. (S) Next steps:

-- Disappearances continue to decline, and investigations continue to rise. The team under A.G. Peiris, in particular, should examine and process more cases. -- All remaining child soldiers accounted for and discharged/rehabilitated. -- Press freedom: threats to individual journalists must end, along with atmosphere of intimidation. -- Press freedom: progress made in investigation of the killing a year ago of Sunday Leader editor Lasantha Wickramatunga. -- Remaining ex-LTTE "new" detainees, held since the end of the war, are placed within a legal structure. All "older" LTTE and Tamil detainees, held since before the end of the war, are charged and prosecuted or released. -- Lifting the Emergency Regulations. -- Less harassment and intimidation of civil society organizations.

Political Reconciliation

------------------------

9. (S) Although progress has been slow, the presidential elections -- particularly the fact that the two main candidates are splitting the Sinhalese vote -- has moved reconciliation issues higher on the political agenda. The A-9 road has been opened for nearly all travel by Sri Lankans (NOTE: Foreigners are still not permitted to drive into the North. END NOTE.), the curfew in Jaffna has ended, and fishing restrictions in the North have been largely

COLOMBO 00000050 003.6 OF 004

eliminated. Of the 12,000 ex-LTTE combatants held in detainment camps since the end of the war, 712 were released the week after the New Year, and the government has announced it would release an additional 1,000 shortly. General Fonseka has made reconciliation a prominent issue in his campaign, signing a ten-point program for devolving power to the North-East. In addition, in his widely distributed campaign manifesto, Fonseka has promised he would: (a) abolish the Executive Presidency; (b) reactivate the 17th Amendment to the Constitution; (c) end the culture of "white van" disappearances and extra-judicial killings; (d) eliminate the press council and establish an environment of free media; (e) return all remaining IDPs and double the resettlement allowance they receive to 100,000 rupees (about USD 880); (f) amend the Emergency Regulations; and (g) deal with all war-related detainees by either prosecuting them, releasing them, or placing them in rehabilitation programs.

10. (S) Next Steps:

-- Some sort of power-sharing or decentralization arrangement to accommodate minority rights. Should be locally developed (i.e. not necessarily the 13th Amendment) and satisfactory to minority populations in Sri Lanka. -- Lifting of High Security Zones. -- Unrestricted access permitted throughout the North for all Sri Lankans, diplomats, journalists, and NGOs. -- Remaining no-threat or low-threat ex-LTTE combatants in "new detainee" camps are released or placed into rehabilitation programs. -- Any low-risk "older" LTTE detainees convicted within the justice system are removed from prison and placed into rehabilitation programs.

Accountability

--------------

11. (S) Accountability for alleged crimes committed by GSL troops and officials during the war is the most difficult issue on our bilateral agenda, and the one we believe has the lowest prospect for forward movement. There are no examples of a sitting regime undertaking wholesale investigations of its own troops or senior officials for war crimes. In Sri Lanka this is further complicated by the fact that responsibility for many of the alleged crimes rests with the country's senior civilian and military leadership, including President Rajapaksa and his brothers and opposition candidate General Fonseka. Moreover, the fact that the LTTE leadership has been destroyed and there is virtually no one to hold accountable for LTTE war crimes makes prosecutions of GSL troops or officials that much more difficult.

12. (S) Accountability also has not been a top priority for Tamils in Sri Lanka. While Tamils have told us they would like to see some form of accountability, they have been pragmatic in what they can expect and have focused instead on securing greater rights and freedoms, resolving the IDP question, and improving economic prospects in the war-ravaged and former LTTE-occupied areas. Indeed, while they wanted to keep the issue alive for possible future action, Tamil leaders with whom we spoke in Colombo, Jaffna, and elsewhere said now was not time and that pushing hard on the issue would make them "vulnerable" (ref. B).

13. (S) Despite these considerations, there have been some tentative steps on accountability. Soon after the appearance of the State Department Report to Congress on Incidents, President Rajapaksa announced the formation of an experts' committee to examine the report and to provide him with recommendations on dealing with the allegations. At the end of the year, the president extended the deadline for the

COLOMBO 00000050 004.6 OF 004

committee's recommendations from December 31 until April. For his part, General Fonseka has spoken publicly of the need for a new deal with the Tamils and other minorities. Privately, his campaign manager told the Ambassador that Fonseka had ordered the opposition campaign to begin work planning a "truth and reconciliation" commission (ref. C).

14. (S) Rajapaksa Next Steps:

-- Presidential experts' committee makes credible recommendations for dealing with the allegations in the State Department report. -- A commission is formed to hear complaints and resolve individual cases of war disappearances. -- GSL publicly acknowledges human cost of war and losses on both sides. -- President institutes compensation program for families of civilians killed in the war.

15. (S) Fonseka Next Steps:

-- Begins national dialogue on the war and its human costs. -- Creation of a serious and credible truth and reconciliation mechanism. -- Considers compensation program. BUTENIS

* Sri Lanka

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/221996
US embassy cables: the documents
US embassy cables: Sri Lankan doctors released on bail after charges of false civilian casualty reports

* guardian.co.uk, Thursday 16 December 2010 21.30 GMT
*

Monday, 24 August 2009, 13:34
S E C R E T COLOMBO 000830
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB
EO 12958 DECL: 08/23/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PREF, PHUM, EAID, MOPS, CE
SUBJECT: DOCTORS FROM NO-FIRE ZONE RELEASED ON BAIL
REF: COLOMBO 695
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JAMES R. MOORE. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)

1. (S) Four government doctors, held by the police Criminal Investigation Division (CID) since the end of the war in May for allegedly filing false reports on civilian casualties in the No-Fire Zone during the last several months of the war, were released on bail today. XXXXXXXXXXXX

2. (S) The doctors XXXXXXXXXXXX had been pressured to give the press conference held in early July (reftel), where they recanted all the statements they had made from the No-Fire Zone. They said they were heavily coached for the press conference, given specific lines to say, and even practiced with several members of the local media beforehand. They said they XXXXXXXXXXXX had not lied when giving their original statements during the war.

3. XXXXXXXXXXXX.

4. XXXXXXXXXXXX

5. (S) Comment: The release of the four doctors is a welcome step by the GSL, but clearly they remain under investigation by the CID and now also are potentially under threat of abduction or extrajudicial killing. Post will continue to monitor the situation very closely, but for now the doctors appear to want to maintain as low a profile as possible, without undue attention brought to them either in Sri Lanka or internationally. End Comment. MOORE
US embassy cables: the documents
US embassy cables: Doctors 'pressured' to release civilian casualty figures during Sri Lankan conflict
o guardian.co.uk, Thursday 16 December 2010 21.30 GMT

Monday, 13 July 2009, 10:33
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000695
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB
EO 12958 DECL: 06/25/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PREF, PHUM, PTER, EAID, MOPS, CE
SUBJECT: DOCTORS RECANT EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF CIVILIAN
CASUALTIES
REF: A. COLOMBO 0435 B. COLOMBO 0448 C. COLOMBO 0454 D. COLOMBO 0554
COLOMBO 00000695 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JAMES R. MOORE. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)

1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The five doctors who worked inside the final conflict zone (the government-declared "no-fire zone") and who released accounts of the situation and the numbers of killed and wounded civilians there gave a press conference press conference on July 8. The doctors said they were "pressured" by the LTTE to release the casualty figures during the fighting, and that in reality the number of killed and wounded civilians was much lower. Many international observers doubt the veracity of this "confession", and casualty figures from other sources are inconsistent with the numbers given by the doctors at the press conference. Some have said the doctors were told they must make this sort of statement or be prosecuted for assisting the LTTE. It is not known if they will in fact be released soon, but it appears they have been treated relatively well while in detention. There is some concern for their safety if the doctors are in fact released. END SUMMARY. 2. (SBU) The five doctors who served in the conflict zone during the final weeks and months of the war, and who provided eyewitness accounts of the situation there during the final months of the conflict between the GSL and the LTTE publicly retracted their previous statements during a press conference arranged by the Government on July 8. The doctors announced that they were "pressured" by the LTTE to make the original statements. The five were taken into custody by the Army at the end of the conflict in May, but are now in CID (police) custody. They said they have been treated well and have been given medical attention. They noted in their statements that during the conflict they had exaggerated the number of killed and injured and also stated that there had never been a shortage of food in the zone. The doctors reported that in reality many civilians were killed trying to escape the LTTE and that the LTTE had commandeered medical supplies brought into the zone for civilians for the wounded LTTE cadres. They said LTTE officials would hand them lists of figures to cite, and then give them phone numbers of sympathetic journalists to contact with the reports. The doctors stated that the actual number of civilian deaths from January until the end of the conflict in mid-May was between 600 and 650, with 1,200 injured during that same time period.

3. (S) International media and NGOs are skeptical of the doctors' statements at the news conference. Credible local NGO sources have said the families were told the doctors may be released following such confessions and they may have had to videotape individual confessions for the president. While it is difficult to pin down solid numbers on anything that happened in the last months of the conflict, other relatively verifiable sources of information are clearly at odds with these figures. The ICRC reported on May 12 that since mid-February it had evacuated nearly 14,000 sick or wounded civilians and their relatives. Unofficial UN estimates for Tamil civilian deaths over roughly the same January to mid-May time period are more than ten times as high, between 7,000 and 8,000. Those UN estimates did not rigorously seek to exclude deaths of possible LTTE conscripts, but it is unlikely that a ten-fold increase in figures over what the doctors stated this week would be due solely to deaths of LTTE cadres mixed in with the civilian population. 4. (S) Of particular concern is what will happen to the doctors if in fact they are released soon. In a meeting with the Ambassador on May 20, the Defense Secretary indicated that it would probably not be safe to free the doctors until

COLOMBO 00000695 002.3 OF 002

after passions had cooled. More recently a senior contact in the CID was demoted because he had worked to improve the detention conditions of the doctors and apparently had expressed too strong of a desire to improve their welfare. 5. (C) COMMENT: The dead and wounded figures given by the doctors at the July 8 press conference would appear to underestimate the true number of casualties during the final months of conflict in the no-fire zone. The GSL appears to be continuing its efforts to downplay the extent of civilian suffering during the last weeks and days of the war. However, a willingness to arrange for the doctors to be released following this confession could signal an effort by the GSL to appease international criticism. If the doctors are released, it will be critical for the GSL to take meaningful action to ensure that the doctors are not then "disappeared" in order to prevent them from making any modifications to this press statement. MOORE
US embassy cables: Sri Lankan government accused of complicity in human rights abuses
o guardian.co.uk, Thursday 16 December 2010 21.30 GMT

Friday, 18 May 2007, 09:22
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 COLOMBO 000728
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS
MCC FOR S GROFF, D TETER, D NASSIRY AND E BURKE
EO 12958 DECL: 05/18/2017
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, PHUM, MOPS, CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: GSL COMPLICITY IN PARAMILITARY
FACTIONS' HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
REF: A. COLOMBO 591 B. COLOMBO 561 C. COLOMBO 463 D. COLOMBO 460 E. 2006 COLOMBO 2056 F. 2006 COLOMBO 1896 G. 2005 COLOMBO 2157 H. 2004 COLOMBO 1219
Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b, d)

1. (S) SUMMARY: Allegations of government complicity in crimes committed by organized paramilitary groups have mounted in the last year. Paramilitaries such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)-breakaway Karuna group and Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) have helped the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) to fight the LTTE, to kidnap suspected LTTE collaborators, and to give the GSL a measure of deniability. The GSL, which denies any links to paramilitary groups, has recently touted its efforts to improve its human rights record, such as the re-publication of procedures on arrests and detentions and the appointment of a "One-Man Commission" to investigate reported disappearances (ref C). However, these efforts so far appear aimed more at improving Sri Lanka's image abroad and have yet to produce concrete improvements in the human rights situation. Outside the capital, the incidence of human rights abuses has continued, including extrajudicial killings, abductions, child trafficking, extortion, and prostitution. President Rajapaksa's government, strapped for cash, has cut direct payments to paramilitaries initiated by former President Kumaratunga and instead turns a blind eye to extortion and kidnapping for ransom by EPDP and Karuna. While many of the charges against the government have been made in public fora, a growing number of trusted Embassy contacts, often at personal risk, have described in detail the extent of the GSL's involvement with paramilitary groups. END SUMMARY.

GSL Finds Paramilitaries Useful

-------------------------------

2. (S) The GSL sees several advantages in allowing paramilitary groups to operate in the country. Paramilitary groups in the North and East help the GSL fight the LTTE and compete with the LTTE for public support and new recruits. These groups also enhance security in Colombo by kidnapping and sometimes killing those suspected of working with the LTTE. Frequent abductions by paramilitaries keep critics of the GSL fearful and quiet. Ultimately, the GSL's objective is to turn Karuna and EPDP leader Douglas Devananda into pro-GSL political leaders in the East and North, respectively. The government hopes this will ensure long term control over these areas even if some form of devolution is instituted.

3. (S) In the meantime, these paramilitary groups give the GSL a measure of deniability. XXXXXXXXXXXX

told us that some military commanders in JaffnaXXXXXXXXXXXX want to clamp down on paramilitaries but have orders from Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa to not interfere with the paramilitaries on the grounds that they are doing "work" that the military cannot do because of international scrutiny. On XXXXXXXXXXXX confided to XXXXXXXXXXXX that the Defense Ministry had instructed him not to interfere with "military intelligence" operations (ref E).

COLOMBO 00000728 002 OF 006

4. (S) The GSL has a history of funding paramilitary groups. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out that under former President Kumaratunga, the GSL had begun the practice of paying paramilitaries to refrain from engaging in criminal pursuits. Several Embassy interlocutors have independently confirmed this. However, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the current government, cash-strapped, has ended this arrangement. Instead, he alleged, Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa has authorized EPDP and Karuna to collect the money from Tamil businessmen. This may account for the sharp rise in lawlessness, especially extortion and kidnapping, that many have documented in Vavuniya and Colombo. Even though EPDP and Karuna are each comprised nearly exclusively of ethnic Tamils, the crimes that they commit are almost always against other Tamils.

Karuna Group Becomes Pre-eminent Paramilitary

---------------------------------------------

5. (S) The Karuna faction's formal name is Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), which means "Liberation Tigers of the Tamil People" in Tamil. This name is an attempt to sap legitimacy from the LTTE by taking the "Liberation Tigers" part of their name. In less than one year since Karuna returned to Sri Lanka, the TMVP has become the most powerful paramilitary organization in the country. It began in 2004 when Karuna broke away from the LTTE, taking about 4,000 Tiger cadres with him (ref H). After the LTTE struck back, inflicting serious losses, then-President Chandrika Kumaratunga helped Karuna escape to the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, where he remained until July 2006. He remained active in managing his cadres even while living abroad. Since returning to Sri Lanka, Karuna has used strong-arm tactics to establish a powerful paramilitary group that operates under government protection (ref D).

Abductions and Killings

-----------------------

6. (S) The Karuna group is probably the most active Sri Lankan paramilitary in abductions and extrajudicial killings. XXXXXXXXXXXX confided to PolOff that even MPs fear that the GSL will use Karuna to assassinate them. XXXXXXXXXXXX echoed this anxiety to us XXXXXXXXXXXX. A number of XXXXXXXXXXXX MPs, Muslims as well as Tamils, have told us privately that they fear for their lives. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that he believed Karuna set up the assassination of Tamil MP Joseph Pararajasingham on Christmas Day 2005 (ref G) with the help of EPDP leader Devananda. XXXXXXXXXXXX was also positive that Karuna cadres were employed in the killing in Colombo of popular Tamil MP Nadarajah Raviraj on November 10, 2006 (ref F).

7. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed that Karuna has extended his activities to Jaffna from his base in the East. XXXXXXXXXXXX has documented XXXXXXXXXXXX abduction cases in Jaffna XXXXXXXXXXXX, many of which he believes are the responsibility of the Karuna group. XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff that he was discouraged XXXXXXXXXXXX told us he has

COLOMBO 00000728 003 OF 006

evidence of XXXXXXXXXXXX. However, because of XXXXXXXXXXXX and limited resources, he was only able to document a sample XXXXXXXXXXXX.XXXXXXXXXXXX described one abduction in which a man suspected of having ties to the LTTE was taken and a "calling card" was left with a picture of Karuna on the front and a calendar on the back, indicating that the man's "time had run out."

Child Soldiers

--------------

8. (S) The TMVP is allowed to operate throughout the East in close proximity to SLA bases, often with clearly underage cadres guarding its camps with machine guns. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that the GSL allows Karuna's cadres to recruit children forcibly from within IDP camps in the East. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the average age of Karuna recruits is 14. XXXXXXXXXXXX's allegation that Karuna recruits children from IDP camps with the tacit approval of the military was confirmed by XXXXXXXXXXXX. We have received confidential reports of the Karuna group's recruitment and use of child soldiers from a U.S.-based NGO as well.

Extortion and Prostitution Rings

--------------------------------

9. (S) Karuna does not have the international fund-raising network among the Tamil Diaspora that the LTTE has built over the past 25 years. As a result, he has resorted to a wide range of criminal activities. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that when the GSL brings in shipments of food and supplies to IDP camps from Colombo, Karuna's cadres are given the opportunity to go through the shipment first. They are allowed to take any food they need for themselves, as well as any supplies they believe they can sell, with only the left-overs making their way to the IDPs.

11. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX also explained that Karuna operates prostitution rings out of the IDP camps to "take care of" GSL soldiers, stating that the women "had no choice" but to acquiesce to Karuna cadres' demands. XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX independently described how women are forced into prostitution, or to give up their children to traffickers. The methods are similar to those in Jaffna (paras 17-18). Families sometimes try to arrange their daughters' marriages at the age of 12 or 13 in the hope that it will reduce the likelihood of their being forced into prostitution.

12. (S) Although the GSL has consistently denied supporting Karuna, XXXXXXXXXXXX allowed PolOff to listen to tapes of his interview with Gothabaya. The Defense Secretary was effusive in his praise for Karuna and the

SIPDIS benefits the GSLXXXXXXXXXXXX

COLOMBO 00000728 004 OF 006

Making Karuna Legitimate

------------------------

13. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX The TMVP does not yet have the status of a formal political party. According to Sri Lanka's Constitution, new parties cannot register when an election is "pending" in any part of the country. Elections for local councils are long overdue in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, which are now in constitutional limbo following the October 1, 2006 Supreme Court decision to de-merge the two provinces. As a result, the GSL must find an existing political party for Karuna to "join," perhaps later changing the name to TMVP, in order for Karuna to stand for elections. XXXXXXXXXXXX said thatXXXXXXXXXXXX has so far resisted GSL efforts to force a shotgun marriage with Karuna, but that he may ultimately have to yield.

EPDP: "Political Party" and Paramilitary

-----------------------------------------

14. (S) The EPDP, originally called the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), began as a rival to the LTTE. One wing of the EPRLF founded the EPDP as a formal political party when its leader, Douglas Devananda, was elected to Parliament in 1994 and aligned with the government. Devananda continues to hold the single parliamentary seat his party won in the 2004 election. As part of the ruling coalition, he serves as Minister of Social Services and Social Welfare. Although registered as a formal political party, the EPDP remains a feared paramilitary group, wielding non-official power over parts of the Jaffna peninsula and especially the offshore islands with the tacit approval of the Sri Lanka Army.

Extra-Judicial Killings with the Military's Support

--------------------------------------------- ------

15. (S) Working in concert with SLA soldiers stationed in the Jaffna peninsula, the EPDP is able to conduct extortion, abductions, extra-judicial killings and other criminal acts without fear of consequences, according to numerous sources. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us about EPDP's involvement in extra-judicial killings in Jaffna. Independently,XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed much of XXXXXXXXXXXX's account. He explained that when the EPDP intends to kill a target, they first provide notice to the military. The number of soldiers patrolling the streets of Jaffna (40,000 total on the peninsula) is such that there are literally soldiers stationed at every street corner. At an agreed time, all of the soldiers in the designated area take a five to ten minute "break" at once (although the normal practice is to take breaks in shifts). At that point, armed and masked gunmen, often riding on motorcycles, race down the street and assassinate the intended victim. Shortly after the killing, the soldiers' break over, they return to their posts to deal with the aftermath. While police investigations are common, they almost never lead to arrests. XXXXXXXXXXXX also told us of a XXXXXXXXXXXX doctor XXXXXXXXXXXX who performs forced abortions, often under the guise of a regular check-up, on Tamil women suspected of being aligned with the LTTE.

COLOMBO 00000728 005 OF 006

16. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX Child Trafficking

-----------------

17. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he believes that EPDP is operating child trafficking rings in Jaffna with a base on Delft island, which the EPDP "owns." XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that because of the large number of widows in Jaffna, men associated with the EPDP, often from neighboring villages, are used to seduce women with children, especially girls, with the promise of economic protection. After establishing a relationship, the men then take the children, sometimes by force and sometimes with the promise that they will be provided a better life. The children are sold into slavery, usually boys to work camps and girls to prostitution rings, through EPDP's networks in India and Malaysia. XXXXXXXXXXXX maintains that children are often smuggled out of the country with the help of a corrupt Customs and Immigration official at Bandaranaike International Airport in Colombo.

18. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX's story was partially verified by XXXXXXXXXXXX who stated that the EPDP works in concert with the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) to operate Tamil prostitution rings for the soldiers. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that young women were taken and forced to have sex with between five and ten soldiers a night. Sometimes they are paid approximately a dollar for each "service." The young women's parents are unable to complain to authorities for fear of retribution and because doing so would ruin the girls' reputation, making it impossible for them ever to marry. Families have begun arranging marriages for their daughters at a very young age in the hopes that the EPDP and soldiers will be less likely to take them. In addition to trafficking in children, XXXXXXXXXXXX detailed how the EPDP operates an illicit alcohol smuggling ring using child "mules."

U.S. Takes a Hard Line against Paramilitaries

---------------------------------------------

19. (S) Addressing the activities of these paramilitaries and their blatant disregard for human rights is a top priority of the Embassy. Ambassador, DCM and Pol Chief have met repeatedly with the President, the Foreign Minister, Foreign Secretary, Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa, Human Rights Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe and others to emphasize the importance of reining in these groups and ending the abductions, killings, and other human rights abuses. Visiting senior USG officials, including Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) Richard

SIPDIS Boucher and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for SCA Steven Mann have delivered tough messages on human rights to the highest levels of the GSL, noting that continued abuses could affect defense cooperation.

COLOMBO 00000728 006 OF 006

20. (S) COMMENT: While none of the evidence put forward by our contacts constitutes a smoking gun, the preponderance of these statements ) and the extent to which they independently corroborate each other ) points to a pattern of GSL complicity with paramilitary groups on multiple levels. It appears that this involvement goes beyond merely turning a blind eye to these organizations' less savory activities. At worst, these accounts suggest that top leaders of its security establishment may be providing direction to these paramilitaries. While it is perhaps understandable that the GSL wants to use every possible means in its war against LTTE terror, we must continue to stress to the Government the importance of reining in the paramilitaries and establishing internationally accepted norms for arresting, investigating, prosecuting and, if appropriate, punishing those suspected of cooperating with the LTTE. BLAKE
Series: US embassy cables: the documents

US embassy cables: the documents
US embassy cables: Indian officials tell US neither Sri Lanka government nor Tamil Tigers respect international community
+ guardian.co.uk, Thursday 16 December 2010 21.30 GMT

Friday, 27 April 2007, 12:27
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002037
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/11/2012
TAGS PREL, PGOV, BG">BG, BM, CE, IN
SUBJECT: INDIAN OFFICIAL SEES BANGLADESH AT CROSSROADS, SRI
LANKA DETERIORATING, BURMA RELATIONS BECOMING UNIDIMENSIONAL
Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
Summary
1. Indian officials warn US counterparts the situation in Sri lanka is "beyond bleak" and that neither the government nor Tamil separatists fighting in the island nation's north have any "regard" for the international community ... and request a briefing on China's aid to Colombo. Key passage highlighted in yellow

1. (C) Summary. In a meeting with PolCouns on April 26, MEA Joint Secretary Mohan Kumar:

-- said that the caretaker government in Bangladesh has reached a crossroads by allowing Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia to return, stating such a move weakens the government and will force it to reassert itself in some way; -- suggested the U.S., UK and India agree on a core message to give the Bangladeshi caretaker government, one that supports the government while it remains on a path toward credible elections but clarifies that the military needs to remain out of politics; -- provided his assessment that Chief Advisor Fakhruddin is not in control of the government, but rather the executor for a military which looms in the background; -- praised the progress which has been made between the Indian Border Security Forces and the Bangladeshi Rifles; -- asked for U.S. assistance in getting Bangladesh to open its economy; -- stated Indian influence in Burma is waning, suggesting that U.S. pressure to bring Burma before the UN Security Council was counterproductive; -- denied reports that India had provided Rangoon with T-55 tanks; -- offered to verify whether India will fulfill a request by a Burmese general to provide infantry weapons and ammunition; -- confirmed that the Indian Navy is stepping up patrols in the waters between India and Sri Lanka; and -- expressed concern over China's participation in the port project in Hambantota, Sri Lanka.

End Summary.

Bangladesh At a Crossroads

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2. (C) PolCouns met April 26 with Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Joint Secretary (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Myanmar) Mohan Kumar to discuss India's assessment of recent events in the region. Also initially in attendance was British High Commission PolCouns Alex Hall-Hall, who had coincidentally been discussing Bangladesh with Kumar when PolCouns walked in. Kumar and Hall-Hall described their conversation, agreeing that the recent decision by the caretaker government (CTG) in Bangladesh to allow Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia to return had put that country at a crossroads. The government had gone back on its strategy to remove the two women from the political scene, they assessed, would be weakened, and the question now was whether the government will reassert itself by pushing the election schedule forward, or by digging in its heels and seeking to remain in power longer. Kumar presented a third option, that either the military or one of the women would stir up civil unrest, which could then be used as a pretext by the military to step in and take political control, although he admitted he did not believe a military coup was likely. Kumar suggested that now would be an opportune moment for the U.S., UK and India to agree on a core message to take to the caretaker government, pressing for elections and voter list reforms, providing support for the government as long as it sticks to a schedule for elections, and making clear that the military needs to remain out of politics. Hall-Hall noted that any coordination needed to remain invisible to the Bangladeshi public in order to avoid the perception of some sort of conspiracy.

3. (C) Kumar said India is concerned with the time frame for Bangladeshi elections, given -- in his analysis -- that the government has been weakened. He believed the interim government would benefit by moving up elections to the first quarter of 2008. He noted that he had been the notetaker for the April 4 meeting between Prime Minister Singh and Chief Advisor Fakhruddin, and his impression was that Fakhruddin "was not a free agent." Fakhruddin made no commitments and could not clearly explain the government's strategy, leading Kumar to believe Fakhruddin was merely the executor of the military's political control.

4. (C) Kumar stated that good progress had been made in talks between India's Border Security Forces and the Bangladesh

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Rifles. The five-day February meeting between high-level officials was "fantastic," he said, adding that guards on both sides of the border have cooperated better since the meeting. (Note: Kumar's comments echo what Bangladesh Embassy Political Minister Mashfee Binte Shams told Poloff earlier in the week, that the BSF and BDR have relieved border tensions and improved communications. End Note.)

5. (C) The U.S. and UK could help India by pressing Bangladesh to open its economy and trade, Kumar suggested. Companies such as Tata, which have made efforts to enter the Bangladeshi manufacturing market, are reporting to Kumar that the CTG is impeding its entry into Bangladesh. Kumar said he has met with representatives of the Asian Development Bank, who have been positive regarding the potential for infrastructure projects in the region, but in terms of assisting with India-Bangladesh trade have only suggested some smaller connectivity projects.

6. (C) PolCouns referred to press accounts of the recent visit to New Delhi by Burmese Quartermaster General Lt. Gen Thiha Thura Tin Aung Myint Oo, which reported that Lt. Gen Tin had come requesting infantry weapons and ammunition in return for the junta's help in flushing out insurgents based along the border. Kumar said he was unaware of any promises India made to provide such materiel, but would check on the report's veracity. He stated India is losing influence -- and gas deals -- in Burma to China, and suggested that American pressure on India to press the junta on democracy and human rights was counterproductive. The more the U.S. presses India to bring Burma before the UN Security Council, he said, the more the Burmese tell India to "go to hell." PolCouns strongly countered, pointing out the junta's horrible record on human rights and democracy dating back years, and stressed to Kumar that any assistance to the Burmese regime by India would be poorly received by Washington.

7. (C) India-Burma relations have deteriorated to being unidimensional, Kumar said, with the only cooperation being on the anti-insurgency campaign along the border. India is not getting any gas contracts from Burma ("We're getting screwed on gas" were Kumar's exact words, reflective of his candid nature), nor is it getting the transit rights it seeks which would open a bridge to East Asia. Burmese officials have told Kumar that they "hate" the Chinese and would prefer not to cooperate with China, but do so because they feel Beijing is more reliable than New Delhi. He claimed a recent report that India was planning to provide Burma with T-55 tanks was untrue.

8. (C) The situation in Sri Lanka is "bad, really bad - beyond bleak" in Kumar's judgment. Characterizing the government and the LTTE as two sets of people with scant regard for the international community, Kumar was skeptical that political progress could be achieved anytime soon. He confirmed reports that the Indian Navy has stepped up patrols in the Palk Strait, and said that India and Sri Lanka are doing coordinated patrolling to prevent the smuggling of weapons from the Tamil Nadu coast. Kumar said it would be helpful to get the American assessment of the port being built in Hambantota, which he estimated China was willing to spend $500 million to help develop. He noted that China has increased its influence with President Rajapaksa, opining that Rajapaksa had a "soft spot" for China following his visit to Beijing in March.

9. (SBU) Bio note. Kumar confirmed he has been selected to become the Deputy Chief of Mission at the Indian Embassy in Paris, likely to assume the position in August. KAESTNER

Series: US embassy cables: the documents
US embassy cables: the documents
US embassy cables: Rajapaksa shares responsibility for 2009 Sri Lankan massacre
# guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 1 December 2010 19.10 GMT

Friday, 15 January 2010, 12:23
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000032
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB
EO 12958 DECL: 01/15/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PREF, PHUM, PTER, EAID, MOPS, CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA WAR-CRIMES ACCOUNTABILITY: THE TAMIL
PERSPECTIVE
REF: A. 09 COLOMBO 1180 B. COLOMBO 8
COLOMBO 00000032 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)
Summary
1. US ambassador to Colombo said that the main reason there will not be a Sri Lankan enquiries into the mass killings that marked the end of the war with the Tamil Tigers last year was that President Mahinda Rajapaksa, bears much of the responsibility, along with his government, generals and some of his family. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

2. Read related article

1. (S) SUMMARY: There have been a few tentative steps on accountability for crimes allegedly committed by Sri Lankan troops and civilian officials during the war with the LTTE. President Rajapaksa named a committee to make recommendations to him on the U.S. incidents report by April, and candidate Fonseka has discussed privately the formation of some form of "truth and reconciliation" commission. Otherwise, accountability has not been a high-profile issue -- including for Tamils in Sri Lanka. While Tamils have told us they would like to see some form of accountability, they have been pragmatic in what they can expect and have focused instead on securing greater rights and freedoms, resolving the IDP question, and improving economic prospects in the war-ravaged and former LTTE-occupied areas. Indeed, while they wanted to keep the issue alive for possible future action, Tamil politicians with whom we spoke in Colombo, Jaffna, and elsewhere said now was not time and that pushing hard on the issue would make them "vulnerable." END SUMMARY.

ACCOUNTABILITY AS A POLITICAL ISSUE

-----------------------------------

2. (S) Accountability for alleged crimes committed by GSL troops and officials during the war is the most difficult issue on our bilateral agenda. (NOTE: Both the State Department Report to Congress on Incidents during the Conflict and the widely read report by the University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) also detailed many incidents of alleged crimes perpetrated by the LTTE. Most of the LTTE leadership was killed at the end of the war, leaving few to be held responsible for those crimes. The Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) is holding thousands of mid- and lower-level ex-LTTE combatants for future rehabilitation and/or criminal prosecution. It is unclear whether any such prosecutions will meet international standards. END NOTE.) There have been some tentative steps on accountability on the GSL side. Soon after the appearance of the State Department report, President Rajapaksa announced the formation of an experts' committee to examine the report and to provide him with recommendations on dealing with the allegations. At the end of the year, the president extended the deadline for the committee's recommendations from December 31 until April. For his part, General Fonseka has spoken publicly of the need for a new deal with the Tamils and other minorities. Privately, his campaign manager told the Ambassador that Fonseka had ordered the opposition campaign to begin work planning a "truth and reconciliation" commission (ref B).

3. (S) These tentative steps notwithstanding, accountability has not been a high-profile issue in the presidential election -- other than President Rajapaksa's promises personally to stand up to any international power or body that would try to prosecute Sri Lankan war heroes. While regrettable, the lack of attention to accountability is not surprising. There are no examples we know of a regime undertaking wholesale investigations of its own troops or senior officials for war crimes while that regime or government remained in power. In Sri Lanka this is further complicated by the fact that responsibility for many of the alleged crimes rests with the country's senior civilian and military leadership, including President Rajapaksa and his brothers and opposition candidate General Fonseka.

THE TAMIL PERSPECTIVE

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4. (S) For different reasons, of course, accountability also has not been a top priority for most Tamils in Sri Lanka. While Tamils have told us they would like to see some form of accountability, they have been pragmatic in what they can expect and have focused instead on securing greater rights and freedoms, resolving the IDP question, and improving economic prospects in the war-ravaged and former LTTE-occupied areas. Indeed, while they wanted to keep the issue alive for possible future action, Tamil leaders with whom we spoke in Colombo, Jaffna, and elsewhere said now was not time and that pushing hard on the issue would make them "vulnerable."

5. (S) The one prominent Tamil who has spoken publicly on the issue is Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MP, self-proclaimed presidential candidate, and Prabhakaran relative M.K. Sivajilingam. Breaking from both the TNA mainstream and the pro-government Tamil groups, he launched his campaign because he believed neither the government nor the opposition was adequately addressing Tamil issues. Sivajilingam has focused on creating a de-centralized federal structure in Sri Lanka with separate prime ministers for the Sinhalese and Tamils, but he also has spoken about accountability, demanding an international inquiry to get justice for the deaths and suffering of the Tamil people.

6. (S) Other Tamil politicians have not made public statements on accountability and are generally more pragmatic in their thinking. In our multiple recent discussions with TNA leader R. Sampanthan, he said he believed accountability was important and he welcomed the international community's -- especially the diaspora's -- interest in the issue. But Sampanthan was realistic about the dim prospects for any Sri Lankan government to take up the issue. Granting that governments in power do not investigate their own, Sampanthan nevertheless said it was important to the health of the nation to get the truth out. While he believed the Tamil community was "vulnerable" on the issue and said he would not discuss "war crimes" per se in parliament for fear of retaliation, Sampanthan would emphasize the importance of people knowing the truth about what happened during the war. We also have asked Sampanthan repeatedly for his ideas on an accountability mechanism that would be credible to Tamils and possible within the current political context, but he has not been able to provide such a model.

7. (S) Mano Ganesan, MP and leader of the ethnic Tamil Democratic People's Front (DPF), is a Colombo-based Tamil who counts as supporters many of the well-educated, long-term Colombo and Western Province resident Tamils, and was an early supporter of Fonseka. The general made promises that convinced him that if Fonseka were to win, ethnic reconciliation issues would then be decided by parliament, not the Executive President. On accountability, Ganesan told us that while the issue was significant XXXXXXXXXXXX accountability was a divisive issue and the focus now had to be on uniting to rid the country of the Rajapaksas.

8. (S) TNA MP Pathmini Sithamparanathan told us in mid-December that the true story of what happened in the final weeks of the war would not go away and would come out eventually, but she also said now was not the time for war crimes-type investigations. Finally, on a recent trip to Jaffna, PolOff found that local politicians did not raise accountability for events at the end of the war as an issue of immediate concern, focusing instead on current bread-and-butter issues, such as IDP releases, concerns about Sinhala emigration to traditional Tamil regions, and

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re-developing the local economy.

COMMENT

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9. (S) Accountability is clearly an issue of importance for the ultimate political and moral health of Sri Lankan society. There is an obvious split, however, between the Tamil diaspora and Tamils in Sri Lanka on how and when to address the issue. While we understand the former would like to see the issue as an immediate top-priority issue, most Tamils in Sri Lanka appear to think it is both unrealistic and counter-productive to push the issue too aggressively now. While Tamil leaders are very vocal and committed to national reconciliation and creating a political system more equitable to all ethnic communities, they believe themselves vulnerable to political or even physical attack if they raise the issue of accountability publicly, and common Tamils appear focused on more immediate economic and social concerns. A few have suggested to us that while they cannot address the issue, they would like to see the international community push it. Such an approach, however, would seem to play into the super-heated campaign rhetoric of Rajapaksa and his allies that there is an international conspiracy against Sri Lanka and its "war heroes." BUTENIS